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Brexiting into Uncharted Waters 
British Referendum Initiates Complex Exit Negotiations – and Perhaps Renewal 
of the European Union 
Barbara Lippert and Nicolai von Ondarza 
The British vote to leave takes the European Union into new legal and political terri-
tory. With application of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union on the cards for 
the first time, it is already clear that leaving is not simply the reverse of joining, neither 
procedurally nor politically. The remaining EU-27 will need to develop an “exit doc-
trine” defining the rules for dealing with the United Kingdom as soon as it officially 
announces its intention to leave. Article 50 leaves ample political options for shaping 
the highly complex processes for releasing the United Kingdom from membership, 
reshaping its relationship with the Union and revising the treaties for an EU-27. 
Already crisis-stressed and disorientated before Brexit, the Union needs a renewal 
of integration, starting with the member states and their role in the EU system. 
 
It is not without irony that Britain is the 
first country to leave the European Union. 
It was also the most prominent participant 
in the first enlargement of the European 
Communities in 1973, after twice unsuc-
cessfully applying for membership in the 
1960s. Enlargement meant considering the 
“in/out” question in detail for the first time 
(also in relation to association requests 
from Greece and Turkey), and required the 
EEC to spell out its principles for accepting 
new members and define the modalities for 
concrete accession negotiations. The acces-
sion articles in the EEC and Euratom 
treaties – like Article 50 today – set only a 
general framework that had to be filled 
out politically. The association option was 
similarly undefined. The “enlargement 
doctrine” developed by the six founding 
states exists to this day with minor modifi-
cations. Now the European Union needs 
a comparably clear doctrine to deal with 
countries wishing to leave. Regardless if 
and when London actually triggers Article 
50, the contours of an “exit doctrine” are 
already beginning to emerge. 
The Right to Leave 
The option to withdraw from the Union 
was not formalised in EU law until 2009, in 
the Treaty of Lisbon. In underlining the 
voluntary nature of EU membership, Article 
50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
contradicts the political foundation of 
European integration – the concept of the 
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European Union as a permanent legal 
union of states and citizens. Under Article 
50, any EU state may notify the EU of its 
intent to withdraw from the Union. Like 
the application to join, this notification is 
a fully sovereign and unilateral decision 
of the respective state, which is entitled to 
expect the request to be honoured. The 
Union has no legal option to force a mem-
ber out or to trigger Article 50 if the UK 
wants to wait, only the possibility to sus-
pend certain membership rights (including 
voting rights in the Council) in response 
to a “serious and persistent breach” of EU 
values. Brexit will mean applying Article 50 
for the first time, seven years after its intro-
duction – dashing hopes that it would 
remain merely symbolic. 
The Objective 
Neither side – EU-27 or United Kingdom – 
is as clear about the goals of the British 
withdrawal process as in the negotiations 
leading to accession. In the latter case, 
enlargement doctrine and practice de-
manded that the new member accept the 
EU’s acquis in toto, moderated only by 
limited transitional periods. All that was 
needed was to regulate the modalities of 
acceptance, but not the substance of the 
relationship. When the remaining twenty-
seven members negotiate with the United 
Kingdom over its departure the constella-
tion is unlikely to be so one-sided. While 
the purpose of Article 50 is to release the 
former member from the treaties through 
a withdrawal agreement, both sides are 
likely to be interested in avoiding a com-
plete and total rupture. 
At the same time, the shape of any new 
arrangement with the United Kingdom as 
future non-member remains unclear. Will 
trade arrangements be reduced to a bare-
bones free trade area with new non-tariff 
barriers and limits to trade in capital and 
services? Or should the Union grant the 
UK full access to the single market with its 
four freedoms, and if so, under which con-
ditions? The relevance of existing arrange-
ments for cooperation and integration of 
third countries below the threshold of 
membership also remains unclear. Exam-
ples include the European Economic Area 
(EEA), the bilateral agreements with 
Switzerland and the comprehensive free 
trade agreement with Canada (CETA), as 
well as the association agreement with 
Ukraine and the customs union with Tur-
key. For the withdrawal agreement it 
should suffice for the twenty-seven to agree 
that the separation occurs with the inten-
tion of replacing membership with some 
form of association. They will also then 
have to define the conditions the British 
must satisfy for that to occur. 
Three Separate Agreements 
The European Union now has to set in 
motion three new agreements: (1) the 
withdrawal agreement with the United 
Kingdom, (2) an agreement regulating 
relations with the non-member United 
Kingdom, potentially a form of association 
under Article 217 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
or an international agreement under 
Article 218 TFEU, and (3) revision of the 
treaties following the departure of the 
United Kingdom under the procedures of 
Article 48 TEU, in order to remove all pro-
tocols relating only to the United Kingdom. 
The latter represents an additional hurdle, 
because altering the treaties requires un-
animity of the member states and the 
approval of the European Parliament to 
avoid calling a Convention for these tech-
nical changes, and ratification by all 
twenty-seven member states according to 
their own constitutions. 
Unlike the act of accession, a withdrawal 
agreement in accordance with Article 50 
cannot itself include treaty amendments; 
these would occur in a separate step. Such a 
procedure fundamentally offers an oppor-
tunity to make other minor changes to the 
treaties – without having to hold the Con-
vention that would normally precede the 
conference of representatives of the govern-
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ments when amending primary law. Espe-
cially in politically turbulent times, com-
plications can be expected from countries 
seeking opportunities to negotiate reduc-
tions in the acquis communautaire and 
strengthen national veto options. Thus 
from the EU perspective it would be advis-
able to coordinate actual withdrawal and 
treaty revisions so that both come into 
force at the same time, to avoid a limited 
revision being instrumentalised to open up 
the treaties across the board. 
Withdrawal Agreement and 
New Relationship 
Tying together the withdrawal agreement 
and the new arrangements will be politi-
cally tricky. The withdrawal agreement is 
already likely to involve ideas as to how 
the EU-27 and the United Kingdom wish to 
shape their future relations. Rigid insist-
ence on a sequence where the withdrawal 
agreement has to be in place before negotia-
tions on the new relationship start is not 
an option, as Article 50 states that the with-
drawal agreement should take account of 
“the framework for [the withdrawing mem-
ber’s] future relationship with the Union”. 
While that provision may make sense in 
the abstract, it raises political and practical 
difficulties if interpreted as conditionality. 
With experience showing that negotiat-
ing a probably very comprehensive associa-
tion agreement with the United Kingdom 
will take years, the EU should interpret the 
“framework” referred to in Article 50 to 
mean only a rough outline. Another factor 
is that the withdrawal agreement must 
only be approved by the European Parlia-
ment, whereas redefining the relationship 
will most likely require a mixed agreement 
ratified by the national parliaments. 
The United Kingdom remains a member 
of the European Union until the withdraw-
al agreement comes into effect. The Union 
must avoid anything that gives London 
additional incentives to delay its – chosen 
but likely painful – withdrawal in order to 
enjoy the fruits of membership for as long 
as possible (“the best of both worlds”) and 
to secure optimal new terms for itself. This 
is why EU representatives stress that there 
can be no one-sided gradual withdrawal 
from the duties of a member state, because 
the United Kingdom’s rights also remain 
undiminished until the date it leaves. The 
United Kingdom remains bound by the 
duty of sincere cooperation, and subject to 
the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice. But with Scottish separatism and 
internal frictions within the Conservative 
and Labour parties likely to colour British 
strategy and tactics, it is easy to imagine 
tensions with London arising in the Euro-
pean Union’s everyday business. Whether 
to include or exclude the United Kingdom 
in ongoing and new EU legislative activities 
will also be a relevant question. Pragmatic 
political solutions are required to give 
those affected legal security. 
In the course of negotiations over the 
two agreements, it will become apparent 
that the simple referendum question 
“remain or leave?” was self-deceptive and 
misleading. For both sides want aspects of 
economic cooperation to continue after the 
United Kingdom leaves. Given that Article 
50 states that “[t]he Treaties shall cease to 
apply to the State in question from the date 
of entry into force of the withdrawal agree-
ment”, a further element of the exit doc-
trine should be to clarify that a partial 
withdrawal (in the sense of graduated mem-
bership) cannot be the outcome of the exit 
talks. The danger of overloading the with-
drawal agreement is already great. But the 
European Union would absolutely paralyse 
itself if it were to put the idea of associate 
membership on the table in the exit talks – 
as former British MEP Andrew Duff did 
some years ago. The European Union’s 
“Article 50 doctrine” should insist that such 
innovations are only addressed in separate 
negotiating contexts, if at all. 
As yet it is neither clear what the United 
Kingdom wants, nor what the European 
Union is willing to accept. London is cer-
tainly the demandeur as far as the new 
arrangement is concerned. Placing condi-
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tions on future access to its internal market 
is not a punishment imposed by the Union 
but a necessary consequence of the British 
decision to leave. Europe’s citizens and eco-
nomic actors will have costs to bear, and it 
will not be possible for everything to remain 
largely as it was. A country that declines 
the responsibilities of membership cannot 
enjoy the same rights as members. A discus-
sion can be expected among the member 
states as to whether to grant the United 
Kingdom a soft landing or to take a hard 
line “pour encourager les autres”. The exit 
talks would be easier and the prospects of a 
soft landing better if the United Kingdom 
had taken the time to explore the possibil-
ity of joining the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA) for example. It could poten-
tially have joined the EEA’s EFTA pillar or 
made proposals for a new third pillar. 
Further elements of an exit doctrine are 
thus seen emerging. Firstly, the European 
Union should not formally tie the with-
drawal agreement to the treaty regulating 
the new relationship. Secondly, it should 
restrict the withdrawal agreement to the 
immediate requirements for removing a 
country from the Union. Thirdly, it should 
insist on preserving the acquis. The EU-27 
should also rapidly agree on their condi-
tions for granting Britain continuing access 
to their internal market. At the same time, 
the Commission should present a frame-
work for the withdrawal agreement that 
outlines which matters need to be nego-
tiated – and thus also defines what matters 
may be left to the agreement governing 
the new relationship. 
A Long Road Out 
Under Article 50 the treaties cease to apply 
two years after the affected member state’s 
notification of its wish to leave. This sunset 
clause is intended to prevent prevarication 
and delaying tactics. In practice, however, 
even longer negotiations can be expected, 
proceeding in three phases. 
We are currently in the first phase, after 
the referendum but before notification 
under Article 50. Given that the two-year 
period for negotiations begins with notifi-
cation, London will choose the time to its 
advantage. The new UK Prime Minister 
Theresa May has already signalled that 
this notification will not come before the 
beginning of 2017 and may be delayed even 
further. In the interim, the British can be 
expected to probe the Union’s unity, and its 
resolve to abide by its refusal of informal 
talks. 
Phase two begins with notification. At 
this point, Brussels will know that London 
really intends to leave, and is not seeking 
special talks outside of Article 50. Now the 
Union will need to quickly name its chief 
negotiator and clarify its internal proce-
dures in order to ensure that it can act col-
lectively in explorations and talks. The 
twenty-seven EU leaders meeting informally 
in June already noted this, and thus defined 
a further element of the exit doctrine. Ger-
many could be particularly tempted to 
enter into separate bilateral talks, because 
London regards Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
government as its most important partner 
in the Union. In order to restrict tactical 
manoeuvring on both sides it is thus im-
perative to clarify the ground rules; that 
means London triggering Article 50. Legally 
and politically there should be scope for 
London to reverse its decision at any point 
before the withdrawal agreement is in force 
and withdraw its notification, for example 
after new elections or a referendum over 
the withdrawal agreement. 
In the second phase the withdrawal 
agreement must then be negotiated within 
two years. An extension of the deadline is 
possible with the approval of both sides, 
which in the case of the EU-27 must be un-
animous. Two years is an extremely short 
window for such talks. But none of the 
member states – the United Kingdom in-
cluded – would prefer an abrupt and 
unregulated separation over a negotiated 
departure. In view of the unsettling effect 
on business and financial markets, both 
sides are also likely to be interested in 
transparency over the exit doctrine and 
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the timetable, in order to keep the process 
predictable. In the European Union’s poli-
tical calendar the next elections for the 
European Parliament represent the latest 
date by which Britain’s exit should be com-
pleted. That would mean by the first half of 
2019 – which would be difficult if the UK 
has not triggered Article 50 by spring 2017. 
While the United Kingdom leaves the 
European Union as soon as the withdrawal 
agreement comes into force, that does not 
mean that the talks are over. In the third 
phase the new relationship will have to 
be defined in all its details. Comparable 
treaties have required years of negotiation 
followed by sometimes prolonged ratifica-
tion. So it may be a long time before rela-
tions between the European Union and the 
United Kingdom have been completely and 
properly reordered. 
Negotiating Parties 
The European Union of twenty-eight con-
tinues to exist until the United Kingdom 
leaves, formally with full British participa-
tion. Only for the purpose of negotiations 
will there be an EU of twenty-seven, where 
the United Kingdom is not represented in 
the Council and the European Council (but 
remains in the European Parliament and 
the Commission). The British have already 
withdrawn from their planned Council 
Presidency in the second half of 2017. 
In the EU-27 the threads of the negotia-
tions will come together in the European 
Council, which will set the mandate for 
the negotiations over the withdrawal agree-
ment. The agreement itself will be nego-
tiated and concluded by the Union, in other 
words by the Council, Commission and 
Parliament. Under Articles 218 and 238 (3b) 
TFEU, the Council takes this decision by a 
larger than usual qualified majority (at 
least twenty member states representing at 
least 65 percent of the population of the 
remaining twenty-seven member states). 
Individual states may thus still be outvoted. 
The Commission (or in the case of foreign 
and security policy the High Representa-
tive) presents recommendations to the 
Council, which then approves the nego-
tiating mandate and appoints the chief 
negotiator. 
The chief negotiator need not automati-
cally come from the Commission or the 
member state holding the rotating Council 
Presidency. It would make sense to form a 
permanent core team around the President 
of the European Council, in order to involve 
the national leaders, and the Commission 
to represent general EU interests, in close 
coordination with representatives of the 
European Parliament. The status of the 
Commission as the guardian of the treaties 
would suggest assigning it a strong role. 
It would examine the legal impact of Brit-
ish withdrawal for the Union. The reper-
cussions on individual member states may 
differ, for example in relation to market 
access or budget questions. The task of ex-
ploring the member states’ positions and 
arriving at a joint negotiating platform 
will fall to the Commission. The Council 
will establish a special committee for the 
talks, which are also likely to be a per-
manent item on the agenda of the Euro-
pean Council. 
Coming Full Circle on Both Sides 
Is the European Union losing Britain for 
lack of flexibility? One could argue more 
credibly the other way around that the 
Union’s flexibility has ultimately failed to 
pay off. If it had followed Britain’s preferred 
principles, the Union would today be lim-
ited to a free trade area lacking the political 
institutions to establish the framework for 
the single market, while including Turkey. 
The United Kingdom joined as a full mem-
ber and exerted decisive influence on the 
first treaty change, the Single European Act 
of 1987. But since 1992 London has incre-
mentally distanced itself from full member-
ship, in order to reconcile political inte-
gration with its concept of an enhanced 
free trade area. Prime Minister John Major 
returned from Maastricht celebrating 
“game, set and match for Britain”, with 
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opt-outs for social charter and single cur-
rency and a ban on the F-word (“federal”). 
Since then the United Kingdom has man-
oeuvred itself steadily to the margins and 
de facto partial membership – but under 
the privileged condition of full participa-
tion in decision-making. Yet even this 
intermediate status ultimately failed to 
persuade the population to vote to remain. 
Whatever its post-exit status, the United 
Kingdom will no longer have a seat at the 
table and its influence will be considerably 
diminished. 
Matters have thus come full circle for 
both, the United Kingdom and the Euro-
pean Union. The British joined the then 
EEC in 1973, under the false premise of 
belonging only to the Common Market and 
evading the compulsions of political inte-
gration. Britain has now corrected that 
misunderstanding, and this could turn it 
into a pole for like-minded countries within 
and outside the Union. The consequence 
could be a regrouping of European states 
along the question of sovereignty, with 
some seeking to form the Europe of inte-
gration while others – like in the 1950s – 
pursue intergovernmental cooperation. 
After a long period of enlargement the 
European Union shrinks visibly for the first 
time (leaving aside the departure of Green-
land in 1985). In the long run, however, 
Brexit bears the potential to boost the 
course of integration towards consolida-
tion of membership, concentration on core 
tasks and renewal of political integration. 
Political Renewal of the Union 
Brexit hits the European Union during a 
phase of weakness, with political and social 
grumblings in many member states. This 
narrows its options and ability to systemat-
ically tackle the structural deficits that 
have emerged, such as within the monetary 
union and the Schengen system. Without 
judicious political guidance the British 
withdrawal process could spark a con-
flagration of fragmentation and disinte-
gration. 
The discussions already under way in 
various configurations within the EU-27 
serve largely to explore political sensitivi-
ties in the member states and identify con-
cepts and approaches, rather than repre-
senting fixed subgroups in a new power 
structure. That is the context for the 
meeting of foreign ministers of the six EU 
founding states in Berlin the weekend after 
the referendum, for the German foreign 
minister’s meeting with his colleagues 
from the Visegrád group, and for the Ger-
man Chancellor’s discussions with the 
French President and the Italian prime 
minister the day before the first summit 
without the British prime minister on 
28/29 June 2016. However, the leading 
group that should assemble around Ger-
many and France needs to extend beyond 
the founding states. Other potential mem-
bers could include Finland (from the north) 
and the Czech Republic (for the Visegrád 
states). The task of this group would not be 
to manage the exit talks, but to politically 
reinvigorate the Union. That is the back-
ground to the announcement of the twenty-
seven heads of state and government that 
the strategy and reflection process will 
extend at least until the sixtieth anniver-
sary of the Treaties of Rome in March 2017. 
It will be important for the European 
Union to switch quickly to a Union of 
twenty-seven with an ambitious programme 
of renewal. For that reason it should al-
ready – in parallel to the first phase of 
the exit talks – initiate the necessary steps 
to improve refugee and asylum policy, 
strengthen coordination of economic 
policy, and expand the security union. The 
economy, and above all the internal mar-
ket, will remain the pacemaker of political 
integration. Motivation for realising a Euro-
pean or multinational border and coast 
guard and other elements of a security 
union is most likely to come from interest 
in preserving the four freedoms of the 
internal market. The renewal agenda needs 
to be initiated before 2017, when elections 
are due in three founding states: Germany, 
France and the Netherlands. 
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This not a struggle over “more” or “less” 
Europe that would do nothing but further 
paralyse the European Union. Practical 
steps are needed, making full use of the 
existing possibilities of the treaties. Mem-
ber states seeking to obstruct joint solu-
tions – whether supranational or inter-
governmental – should expect to witness 
the application of qualified majorities and 
enhanced cooperation. A range of different 
speeds must be expected, and potentially 
also change in areas such as monetary 
union or Schengen. The possibility of one 
or other member seeking to copy the 
British example, or at least threaten to do 
so for internal or European policy aims, 
cannot be ruled out. But aside from Ger-
many and France no other EU member 
wields a potential threat like the United 
Kingdom’s. The European Union will there-
fore have to demonstrate that it is immune 
to blackmail. And that means systematic 
application of Article 50. 
Germany in the EU-27 
Germany’s role in the EU-27 will be even 
more central than in the Union to date. 
This spotlights the question of German 
leadership. For Germany, voluntary inte-
gration in the European Union remains 
key to guarding its political and economic 
interests and exerting influence on the 
regional and global order. Germany may 
weigh up its interests over specific ques-
tions, but its fundamental choice will not 
waver. The benefits of membership are so 
obvious that Germany should be prepared 
to make even larger political and financial 
investments. For example, it would be 
desirable for Berlin to at least tolerate re-
distributive components and elements of 
Keynesian policy in the Eurozone. If Ger-
many is to secure what has been achieved 
in the EU-27, it must do more than act as 
“status quo power” (“Beharrungsmacht”: 
Peter Becker), important as that role may be. 
Brexit’s impact on the EU budget are not 
yet foreseeable. It has yet to be decided how 
the shortfall caused by loss of the British 
contribution will be made up, nor whether 
the distribution rules will change. With 
respect to the next financial framework 
post-2020, Germany should be prepared to 
negotiate at a more fundamental level in 
relation to spending priorities, the budget 
ceiling and alterations to the own resources 
system. Berlin can also inject movement 
into the European Foreign and Security 
Policy, to strengthen the centralisation 
process already initiated with the European 
External Action Service and the High Rep-
resentative and make the European Union – 
collectively or led by a directorate – a more 
viable external actor. After the British ref-
erendum German Foreign Minister Frank-
Walter Steinmeier and his French counter-
part Jean-Marc Ayrault published a paper 
naming important priorities in this con-
nection, including improving strategic 
analysis capacities, civil and military crisis 
management and a European Semester on 
defence capabilities. 
The Legitimacy Deficit 
The Brexit vote has reignited the debate 
about the European Union’s deficits and 
perspectives. With Germany and France the 
federalist and Gaullist options will survive. 
But even these two crucial members do not 
on their own possess the political strength 
to answer fundamental questions such as 
whether the Union should move further 
towards a parliamentary or a presidential 
system of government. Proposals to directly 
elect the Commission President or intro-
duce a division of powers on the national 
model are therefore half-baked and danger-
ous. Institutional reform should proceed 
incrementally in the foreseeable future, for 
example in the context of the special struc-
tures for the Eurozone. The EU system is 
still feeling its way and needs the possi-
bility to correct its course. 
The European Union’s legitimacy deficits 
could be reduced if its performance record 
were better. It must prove that it contrib-
utes to employment, economic growth and 
internal security, and that this output is 
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recognised by member states, political par-
ties and citizens. The pro-European parties 
also need to address the politicisation of EU 
issues in national arenas and tackle the de-
bate over alternative policies, both between 
one another and vis-à-vis anti-European 
and Eurosceptic anti-establishment parties. 
Elections in several member states in 2017 
will force parties to take positions on ques-
tions relating to the European Union, for 
example in asylum and refugee policy or 
freedom of movement in the internal 
market. 
The concrete discussion needs to be con-
ducted in the member states where politics 
comes closer to the citizens than in the civil 
society forums organised by the Brussels 
institutions. It is not only the European 
Union’s ability to solve problems that has 
fallen into disrepute in recent years, but its 
very political order. A tone of belittlement 
if not denigration of the European Union 
as a democratically legitimised frame of 
action has crept into political and media 
discourse. Yet if the remaining twenty-
seven ask the Monty Python question – 
what did the European Union ever do for 
us? – the answer can be found in the very 
real worries now troubling the British: who 
will compensate the loss of regional devel-
opment funding, what will happen to 
access to the Spanish health system, and 
how can British students continue to par-
ticipate in the Erasmus programme? The 
key to restoring confidence and support for 
the EU system lies with the member states 
and their domestic policies. Negative exam-
ples include deliberate rule violations by 
individual governments, a plebiscite-backed 
refusal to implement (as in Hungary) and 
Commission partiality, for example in the 
monitoring of national budgets. 
Germany’s national political debates 
must also do a better job of highlighting 
how international factors play into acute 
problems and where the possibilities and 
limits lie when political challenges are 
addressed at the national, European or 
some other level. In this context it is also 
time to tackle populist slogans promising 
to “take back control”. Such claims played 
a role in the British leave campaign, as well 
as in the German refugee debate. In this 
controversy national governments – not 
least the German – must explain to their 
populations what effects the European 
Union has and does not have on its member 
states, how sovereignty may be strength-
ened if pooled at the European level, what 
options and resources they want to give the 
EU, and which they do not. 
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